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With emendations and qualifications, Ricoeur accepted Habermas’s
four main criticisms of  Gadamerian hermeneutics. The first three seem
by now uncontroversial: philosophical hermeneutics does not take
sufficient account of  power and interest, mistakes ideology for
misunderstanding, and gives too much weight to a prior ontological
consensus.1 The fourth criticism, affirming the need for a critical social
science as a balance to ontological hermeneutics, became a centerpiece
of  Ricoeur’s own project and is still a nexus of  fruitful debate. There
could hardly be a claim against which Gadamer remained more
passionately opposed, and I think the reason for this irreconcilable
difference has to do with the fundamentally different function
hermeneutics served for these two thinkers.
Ricoeur sought not only to bring hermeneutics closer to its
original regional status as an art in dialogue with other arts but also cast
it more narrowly as a scholarly enterprise of  analysis and interpretation
of  signs, symbols, and texts. Gadamer conceived hermeneutics as having
a scope analogous to the rhetorical humanism of  the classical tradition,
and so regarded it as a description of  a general paideia. Like rhetoric,
which is both a theory and a practice, hermeneutics is “the theory and
also the practice” of  understanding.2 The hermeneutical situation for
him was a synonym for the human condition, descriptive more of  its
historical finitude and dependence on contingent judgment than on a
textual tradition. In a way that Gadamer resists with all his energies,
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Ricoeur wants to bring hermeneutics into a close connection with the
realm of  expertise. This distinction between the hermeneutics of  the
discourse specialist and of  the layperson, or the prudent citizen, is an
easily overlooked difference that has enormous consequences.
Although Gadamer sees hermeneutics working at a number
of  different levels, he asserts in a variety of  ways that hermeneutic
understanding is not just about, but is “the way we experience one
another, the way we experience historical traditions, the way we
experience the natural givenness of  our existence and of  our world.”3
Gadamer’s way of  knowing is “a knowledge that rises from the being
of  a person, his human existence, his character, the formulation of  his
entire human demeanor.”4 Reflection is caught up in the circle of  being:
“The reflection that would constitute practical philosophy would
nevertheless with inner necessity have to make the claim not only to
know what the good is, but also to contribute to it. Thus it is in any
event for the decision that faces a person in acting or abstaining: he
wants to know what is best.”5 Hermeneutics “is not just a theory,” but
can be “understood as a teaching about a technical skill (Kunstlehre) in
the manner of  rhetoric too. Like rhetoric, hermeneutics can designate
a natural capacity of  human beings, and then it refers to the human
capacity for intelligent interchange with one’s fellows.”6 “So it appears
to me, heightened theoretic awareness about the experience of
understanding and the practice of  understanding, like philosophical
hermeneutics and one’s own self-understanding, are inseparable.”7
In resisting the objectivity of  empiricism and rationalism,
Gadamer proposes an objectivity tied to the existential pathos of  being
human in a situation.8 One’s comportment towards the world [sich
verhalten] is a question of  finding one’s bearings, a relation that finds its
balance in a holding-back-from as much as holding to oneself. This
kind of  distance gives rise to the famous distinction between world
and environment, but equally important is the strong emphasis this
kind of distance places on what Gadamer is usually accused of ignoring
or diminishing, that is, objectivity. Gadamer writes: “To have an
orientation toward the world, however, means to keep oneself  so free
from what one encounters of  the world that one can present it to
oneself  as it is.”9 Reflective distance, objectivity, is at the heart of  the
dynamic of  linguistic being. Certainly there is a gap,  introduced by
language, between the individual and the power to control meaning,
but the equivocity of  language also provides room for negotiating our
precise relation to the world. Hermeneutic distance does not extract
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and dispose of  the subjective elements of  experience, but rather allows
humans to “bring into proportion, make communicable and place at a
workable distance its threatening, overwhelming immediacy.”10 The text
may be the paradigm of  linguistic distance, as Ricoeur rightly maintains,
but it is still one distance among many. It would be hermeneutically
impossible to find a self-understanding that is not mediated. So this is
not where the genuine break occurs between Gadamer and Ricoeur.
The true break occurs with what Gadamer understands as a
difference of  levels. In a debate with Ricoeur, Gadamer challenges
Ricoeur’s placement of  analysis alongside understanding:
Well, you described the hermeneutic and the structuralist
approaches, and then applied a hermeneutic also to that
contrast. I could not see that it had the same level. I have
no doubt that one can elaborate and use many forms of
explanation. There is not just structuralism; there are many
other ways to interpret a text. I certainly need a great deal
of  knowledge about language and historical conditions
and cultural habits and so on, that is one thing. But to
concretize all that in this unique statement or text that
must recollect all these externalized and objectifiable
aspects, to live through the meaning in concrete fullness,
that is quite another thing.11
Ricoeur’s effort to reintegrate method into the hermeneutic tradition
pivots on his lifelong opposition to Dilthey’s categorial separation of
explanation and understanding in the disposition of scientific
knowledge.12 In this schema, the natural sciences fall under the domain
of  explanation that is subject to the objective analysis of  physical things,
whereas humans can only be studied through interpretation, since the
inner life is accessible through subjective understanding. Ricoeur wants
to say at this point that human beings have no direct self-experience
but must rely indirectly on signs for self-understanding. In correcting
Dilthey, Ricoeur finds a mediating link between explanation and
understanding in these “signs” of  life, which are the objective traces of
subjectivity and ultimately form texts amenable to structural analysis.
With this link hermeneutics does not have to abandon epistemology
in favor of  ontology, but can engage the two in a productive relationship.
Much of  Ricoeur’s effort through his life’s work was the bridging of
epistemology and ontology through the intermediary role of  sign and
text. In the course of  his dialogues with Gadamer, Ricoeur may have
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modified his initial position by stressing that explanation was subordinate
to interpretation, but he never abandoned a characterization of
explanatory analysis as a true science, and the character of  this attribution
gives Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics its decisive difference.
There can be no gainsaying the usefulness of  structural analysis,
of  semiotics and linguistics, of  the cooperation of  the human sciences
in interpretive practice, nor at a broader level, of  the relevance of
methodological rigor, techniques of  measurement and proof, the
splendid machinery of  the social sciences for guarding against prejudice
and false claims. But where Ricoeur and Gadamer part ways is the level
at which expertise and methodological practice is put to use. In
promoting humanism, Gadamer was not only saying that we must rely
upon the authority of tradition, as Ricoeur summarizes it.13 Gadamer
was also affirming the cardinal humanist principle that human beings
are responsible for judgments that do not rely on the realm of the
expert, judgments that take account of  instrumental claims but
ultimately take their own measure. Ricoeur also has a place for this
kind of  judgment, which he calls “attestation,” but it figures differently
in his picture of  hermeneutics. We can pinpoint the place where Ricoeur
diverges from Gadamer quite precisely in his own texts.
The hinge of  Ricoeur’s separation from German hermeneutics
is his promotion of the written text as a moment of objectification
distinctly different in kind from face-to-face dialogue. The separation
of  the text from the ties of  authorship, both in terms of  intention and
context, gives the text an autonomy that a conversation lacks. The text
is freed to a future engagement with readers, both in terms of  their
assimilation into its world, and their elaboration of  new worlds. But
the autonomy of  the text also means that it no longer “finds its norm
of  intelligibility” in the author’s world or intention, and this gives it a
certain freestanding integrity.14 Before the text is restored to its living
communication with a reader in a new context, it is available as “a
worldless and authorless object” to be explained “in terms of  its internal
relations, its structure.”15
Ricoeur’s departure from Gadamer is not over autonomy per
se but over how this autonomy is to be used. For Ricoeur, the distance
of  the text is the occasion for the intercession of  the scholarly task, an
analytic mediation that is part of  the structure of  understanding itself.
Certainly, and Gadamer would have no objection here, disciplinary
sciences feed not only a research tradition but a general education,
even if  this double function is often troubled. But in Ricoeur,
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explanatory analysis is cast as a dialectical partner to the cultivation of
understanding as a human competency. In the metaphorical language
of  textuality, he joins the scholarly work of  textual analysis with the act
of  reading itself. Ricoeur fuses without remainder the explanatory work
of  research to the common human act of  reading, listening, witnessing
(literature, poetry, etc.). The integration of  explanation and
understanding yields a hermeneutics that is tied to the scholarly task.
This seemingly minor point goes to the heart of  Gadamer’s objection.
The scholarly task, the work of  the expert, is suddenly positioned well
above its hermeneutic paygrade.16
The equilibration of  the general reader and the critic, historian,
psychologist or sociologist passes almost imperceptibly in Ricoeur’s
arguments. In a paper titled, significantly, “Appropriation”, it is the
objectification of  the text into an ideality separated from “a given speaker
in a given situation” that leads to the division between explanation and
understanding, and although the actualization into the life experience
of  the reader is neatly separated from the analytic practice, it is this
very division which is labeled a dialectic.17 On the one hand, Ricoeur
attaches the act of  understanding to “anyone who can read,” as befits
the existential scope of  textuality, and to this universality he attaches
the work of  the text in constructing subjectivity: “It is to receive an
enlarged self ” which is “the genuine object of  interpretation.”18 But,
on the other hand, the role of scientific analysis elides with the personal
experience of  reading as if  these two occurred as a matter of  course
on the same level: “It is necessary to have gone as far as possible along
the route of  objectification, to the point where structural analysis
discloses the depth semantics of  a text, before one can claim to ‘understand’
the text in terms of  the ‘matter’ which speaks therefrom. The matter of
the text is not what a naïve reading of  the text reveals but what the
formal arrangement of  the text mediates. If  that is so, then truth and
method do not constitute a disjunction but rather a dialectical process.”19
Notice how the act of  “naïve reading” must be mediated by the work
of  structural analysis. Ricoeur says explicitly that structural analysis is
what leads us from a “naïve reading” to “a learned reading.”20 How can
this transpire except through the ever-present intercession of  the scholar,
researcher, expert? Gadamer pinpoints this extraordinary demand in a
debate with Ricoeur: “Finding a common language is not contributing
to a new handbook of science or thought; it is sharing in a social act .
. . . For the critique of  ideologies, psychoanalysis, and every radical
form of  critique should be and needs to be reintegrated into this basic
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process of  social life—a way which I call (in a manner I find satisfactory)
hermeneutical.”21 This designation of  what hermeneutical means leads
us to what I regard to be the underlying division between Ricoeur and
Gadamer with respect to the role of  science.
The steady historical shift of  hermeneutics from a specialized
technique to a philosophy, with its enlistment into ontological reflection
by Gadamer, gives it a certain shifting indeterminacy. Toward the end
of  his life, Gadamer was increasingly emphatic that hermeneutics was
an art analogous to the ancient art of  rhetoric and in many ways was an
extension of  rhetoric. Like rhetoric, it exhibited itself  as an “innate
ability” common to educated citizens.22 For Gadamer, Socratic ignorance
meant, among other things, separation from the regime of  the expert,
and this extended to the claims of  philosophy and philosophers. Just
as Socrates refuted the pretensions of intellectual professionalism, so
Gadamer modeled philosophical hermeneutics on the rhetorical
competencies of  the vir bonus, the good citizen. The “passion for
questioning,” on his view, is “a natural human tendency.”23 Perhaps the
most explicit statements about this Socratic allegiance occur in the essay
“The Incompetence of  the Philosopher.” Gadamer is disturbed by the
assumption that “there are, or perhaps should be, particular kinds of
people who practice philosophy, which is not the case. Philosophy is
practiced by everybody . . . . Everywhere people are asking philosophical
questions . . . to which no one is in a position to give answers . . . . I am
always amazed that the philosopher, in the academic sense of  the word,
is supposed to have a particular competence.”24 It is in the context of
these remarks that he echoes, by way of  criticism, Ricoeur’s famous
“conflict of  interpretations”: “The conflict is not between the specialized
knowledge of  some experts and the social reality of  practical life, it is
in humanity itself, in its questioning and errors.”25 From this Gadamer
concludes that “each and every one of  us experiences in himself  or
herself  the responsibility which we all bear and which we conceal from
ourselves.”26
Now there is an interesting wrinkle in Gadamer’s position on
the amateurism of  philosophy. He is insistent that there is a sharp
division between practical philosophy and prudential practice, because
philosophy, by thematizing prudence, is one step removed from it.
Nevertheless, this second order function does not have as its necessary
end an academic class of  professionals, instead it is one means by which
“we integrate ourselves into society through education.”27 Everyone,
on his view, needs to be reflective about their practice and to be formed
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by the habit of  reflection.
Ricoeur, by contrast, separates the roles of  the interpreting
reader and the analyst: “Now, upon this understanding by which the
author or reader ‘makes’ the metaphor is superimposed a scholarly
explanation.”28 The second order task of  analyzing the reception of
texts is a “bringing to light the codes underlying this work of  structuring
that is carried through in company with the reader.”29 This coding is
reintegrated back into the reading, but we have already separated out
the two tasks by a division of  labor. The objectivity of  the Habermasian
social scientist remains a part of  Ricoeur’s paradigm of  textual reception.
In Ricoeur’s 1973 Interpretation Theory lectures, a major effort
of  his middle period to relate the various forms of  textual discursivity
through interpretive principles, hermeneutics is regarded quite un-
selfconsciously as a scholarly activity. Ricoeur seeks, without apology,
“procedures for validation” focused on “the analytic structure of  the
text.”30 With respect to all these formulations, it is appropriate, I would
claim, to ask “who” it is that is doing the explanation or interpretation.
Who is it that interprets a mythology by bringing out “the logic of  the
operations” that constitute “the structural law of  the myth”?31 It is
clearly not those who Ricoeur calls “the users of  the narrative,” but the
structuralists who provide the depth semantics of  the text. And because
this whole project stands under the task of  a science of  signs, even the
final informed interpretation belongs to “the world of  the users of  the
narrative, which itself  falls under other semiological disciplines that
deal with social, economic, or ideological systems.”32 The entire
hermeneutic remains within disciplinary structures, and so it never needs
to leave the circle of  expert readers.
Gadamer sees hermeneutics as a broad orientation towards a
liberal paideia for a community, while Ricoeur sees hermeneutics as a
guiding approach to the systematic analysis of  discourse in the scholarly
enterprise. Since the transformative role of  understanding is operative
for both hermeneutics, they have a strong filiation. But, as we have
seen, the differences of application open onto significantly different
views of  what hermeneutics itself  is. It is hard to imagine that Ricoeur
could think in terms of  what Gadamer calls “hermeneutic experience.”
This phrase is simply a descriptor for a way of  being-in-the-world; it is
equivalent for him to our actual social condition. Ricoeur wants to
foster a productive disposition for the sciences and the humanities in
relation to each other. He is talking about how academics do their
work, and that is a project at a very different level. One could extrapolate
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out to transformations in the social order as a result of  this
reconfiguration, but those would be distant effects.
From an institutional perspective concerning the function
hermeneutics serves at the level of  institutions, Gadamer is, ironically,
far more subversive and radical than Ricoeur. Ricoeur accepts to some
extent the basic structure of  the cultural formations responsible for
the production of  knowledge, given his reformist program for the
interaction between the social sciences and the humanities. Gadamer is
trying to overthrow these forms by returning to something closer to
the pre-Enlightenment model of  general education, removing the arts
of  rhetoric and hermeneutics from their location in the research
university as specialized studies and opening them onto the praxis of  a
political culture. As idealized or naïve as this program may be, it should
not be confused with the turn hermeneutics took after Melanchthon
where it became an art of  textual interpretation. Heidegger and
Gadamer completed the return to Melanchthon’s pedagogic program
of  a hermeneutic rhetoric for the school curriculum, a return that was
made possible by Schleiermacher’s universalization of  hermeneutics.33
The countertendency, to treat hermeneutics as a method of  textual
exegesis, is a counter-turning promoted by Dilthey’s closer disciple, Paul
Ricoeur.
We are indebted past any possibility of  repayment to Ricoeur’s
extraordinary contributions to, critiques and extensions of
hermeneutics, and so I want to emphasize that this is a lonely quarrel I
have with him. But the greater part of  Gadamer’s lifelong effort was
devoted to honoring the liberal human competency to communicate,
deliberate, and come to terms. It is not enough to say that explanatory
analysis is subordinate to interpretation if  that analysis is given a
privileged authority. Our deep competence is first and foremost our
ability to communicate with one another and arrive at an understanding,
and expertise will only ever serve as a support for this: “I certainly need
a great deal of  knowledge about language and historical conditions
and cultural habits and so on, that is one thing. But to concretize all
that in this unique statement or text must recollect all these externalized
and objectifiable aspects to live through the meaning in concrete fullness,
that is quite another thing.”34 In the end, the debate about explanation
and understanding is about a very basic existential, perhaps even
biographical, difference. 35 For Gadamer explanation and
understanding are not co-equal. Explanation is a discursive act (an act
of  description, a support for a claim, etc.), a technique of  logic (the
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clarification of  warrants, etc.), a stage in a process of  coming to terms.
It is only one among a repertoire of  discursive competencies (including,
for instance, interrogation, imaginative representation, rumination) that
stand in the service of  better understanding. It is thus secondary to
understanding, which is either a goal in itself, or a prelude to action. To
put explanation and understanding in a dialectical relationship, as Ricoeur
does, is to mistake a secondary function for a primary mode of  being.
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